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COMMENT
INJURY-IN-FACT: SOLVING THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT REGARDING
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING IN
DATA THEFT LITIGATION
SIMONE CADOPPI*

INTRODUCTION
Data theft from cyber threats is a developing problem in our increasingly digitized world.1 Data theft can cause the exposure of sensitive
records and lead to losses of millions of dollars to both businesses and
individuals.2 Victims of data breaches often bring suits against companies that fail to properly safeguard personal information, with hopes that
courts will redress their harms.3 These victims often encounter problems
during the initial stages of their cases when attempting to establish their
right to sue—also known as constitutional standing.4 One such problem
is that the Supreme Court of the United States has not resolved whether
the victims of data breaches have standing to sue for the threat of future
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2022; B.A. History, San
Francisco State University, May 2015. The author would like to thank the entire 2020–2021 and
2021–2022 Golden Gate University Law Review staffs and Professor David Franklyn for their
diligent feedback and unwavering support during the writing of this piece. The author also gives
special thanks to Stefano Cadoppi, Carole Cadoppi, Adrian Cadoppi, and Dario Cadoppi, without
whom none of this would be possible.
1
See Tom Burt, Microsoft Report Shows Increasing Sophistication of Cyber Threats,
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Sept. 29, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/09/29/
microsoft-digital-defense-report-cyber-threats/.
2
Maddie Davis, 4 Damaging After-Effects of a Data Breach, CYBINT (July 25, 2019), https://
www.cybintsolutions.com/4-damaging-after-effects-of-a-data-breach/.
3
See Data Breach Lawsuit, CLASSACTION.COM (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
www.classaction.com/data-breach/lawsuit/.
4
Catherine Padhi, Standing in Data-Breach Actions: Injury in Fact?, LAWFARE (Dec. 18,
2017 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/standing-data-breach-actions-injury-fact.
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harm stemming from stolen data.5 This lack of guidance by the Supreme
Court has resulted in a federal circuit court split about whether a risk of
future harm of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of standing.6
This Comment explores the circuit split with regard to standing in
data theft cases and proposes a solution for the Supreme Court to adopt.
Specifically, the federal circuit courts are divided between a more permissive “substantial risk” standard and a more prohibitive “certainly impending” standard.7 To resolve this split, the Supreme Court should
adopt the more permissive substantial risk standard that only requires
plaintiffs to show that there exists a substantial risk of future harm stemming from an actual data breach.8 Furthermore, when establishing constitutional standing, the Supreme Court should only require that plaintiffs
establish the occurrence of an actual data breach that resulted in the theft
of sensitive information. Part I provides background on data theft and its
increasing prevalence. Part II discusses the elements required to establish
constitutional standing, and how they are analyzed in the context of allegations of threats of future harm. Part III compares historical cases that
have applied a permissive standard to evaluate threats of future harm
with cases that have done so using a more prohibitive standard. Part IV
compares the most recent cases examining the threat of future harm and
evaluates the current status of the circuit split regarding this issue. Part V
proposes a new standard for the Supreme Court to adopt to resolve the
circuit split in data breach cases alleging a risk of future harm.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DATA THEFT
Data breaches were first recorded in 2005 by Privacy Rights Clearing House.9 The DSW Shoe Warehouse data breach in 2005, which compromised approximately 1.4 million credit card names and numbers, was

5

Bradford C. Mank, Article, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the
Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1362-63 (2017).
6
Id.
7
See Second Circuit Seeks to Reconcile Circuit Split Concerning Standing to Bring Data
Privacy Lawsuits, GIBSONDUNN (April 30, 2021), gibsondunn.com/second-circuit-seeks-to-reconcile-circuit-split-concerning-standing-to-bring-data-privacy-lawsuits/.
8
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014).
9
J. Charlton Collins, Check on Data Breaches at the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, JOURNAL
OF ACCOUNTANCY (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2019/sep/databreaches-privacy-rights-clearinghouse.html.
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one of the first major data breaches in the United States.10 Subsequently,
in 2005, 157 data breaches exposed almost 67 million sensitive records.11
Data is commonly classified as either sensitive or non-sensitive.12 In
general, sensitive data reveals financial or health data, or personal information subject to regulations.13 Non-sensitive data includes information
that is a matter of public record or routine business information that is
openly shared, such as information contained in “cookies.”14
In 2009, 498 data breaches exposed over 222 million sensitive
records. Further, in 2015 those numbers rose to 784 data breaches which
exposed over 169 million sensitive records.15 The next few years witnessed an even more staggering increase in data breaches and exposed
records.16 Data breaches from 2017 to 2019 exposed over 833 million
sensitive records, including a whopping 1,257 breaches exposing 471
million sensitive records in 2018 alone.17 When combined, the volume of
both sensitive and non-sensitive records lost to data theft is even more
alarming. In 2017 alone, almost 3.5 billion records were stolen.18
What do cyber criminals do with stolen data? Stolen data is commonly used for data ransom, dark web sales, and identity theft.19 Data
10

Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://privacyrights.org/data-breaches
(last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
11
Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United
States from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (March 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/
data-breaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed.
12
See GDPR Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Data: A Distinction With a Difference, CRITEO
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.criteo.com/blog/gdpr-sensitive-non-sensitive-data-distinction-difference/.
13
Examples of personal information subject to regulations include: racial or ethnic origin,
political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, genetic data, or classified information. Abi Tyas
Tunggal, What is Sensitive Data?, UPGUARD (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.upguard.com/blog/sensitive-data; Rob Sobers, 2019 Data Risk Report Stats and Tips You Won’t Want to Miss, VARONIS
(Jun. 17, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/data-risk-report-highlights-2019/.
14
Abi Tyas Tunggal, What is Sensitive Data?, UPGUARD (Aug. 27, 2021), https://
www.upguard.com/blog/sensitive-data; See Archived: What are Cookies?, KNOWLEDGEBASE (Jan.
18, 2018), https://kb.iu.edu/d/agwm (Defining Cookies as “messages that web servers pass to your
web browser when you visit Internet sites.”) (“These files typically contain information about your
visit to the webpage, as well as any information you’ve volunteered, such as your name and
interests.”)
15
Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United
States from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/databreaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Manisha Verma, The Data Behind Data Breaches: What 7 Charts Tell Us, THOUGHTSPOT,
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.thoughtspot.com/thoughtspot-blog/data-behind-largest-data-breacheswhat-7-charts-tell-us-thoughtspot.
19
What do Hackers do with your stolen data?, SABIO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES (May 15,
2018), http://www.sabioit.com/2018/05/15/hackers-stolen-data/.
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ransom, carried out by ransomware,20 refers to cyber-attacks that block
companies and individuals from accessing their files, databases, and
other computer systems until a ransom is paid.21 Between 2015 and
2021, ransomware damages have increased from $325 million to a projected $20 billion.22 By 2031, ransomware is expected to cost its victims
approximately $265 billion, annually.23 Cyber criminals have used ransomware to attack everything from schools and businesses to healthcare
providers and municipalities.24
Cybercriminals also commonly sell stolen data on the dark web25—
an area of the internet only accessible by using specific software that
protects users’ identities and locations with encryption technology, making users difficult to track.26 The volume of stolen usernames and passwords circulating the dark web has increased by 300% since 2018,
resulting in over 15 billion stolen account login credentials, including
usernames and passwords for online banking, social media accounts, and
streaming services.27 Cybercriminals stand to make a lot of money when
considering the value and amount of stolen credentials on the dark web.28
For example, credit cards average $33.88 per credential, forged documents can net between $70 and $1500, G-mail accounts are worth about
$155, and social media accounts, such as Twitter, start at $49.29
20
“Ransomware is a form of malware that encrypts a victim’s files.” Josh Fruhlinger, Ransomware Explained: How it Works and How to Remove It, CSO (June 19, 2020), https://
www.csoonline.com/article/3236183/what-is-ransomware-how-it-works-and-how-to-remove-it.html.
21
Casey Crane, 20 Ransomware Statistics You’re Powerless to Resist Reading, HASHEDOUT
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.thesslstore.com/blogC/ransomware-statistics/.
22
Id.
23
David Braue, Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted to Exceed $265 Billion By
2031, CYBER SECURITY VENTURES (Jun. 3, 2021), https://cybersecurityventures.com/global-ransom
ware-damage-costs-predicted-to-reach-250-billion-usd-by-2031/.
24
Casey Crane, 20 Ransomware Statistics You’re Powerless to Resist Reading, HASHEDOUT
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/ransomware-statistics/.
25
See Davey Winder, Hacker Gives Away 386 Million Stolen Records On Dark Web—What
You Need To Do Now, FORBES (July 29, 2020, 5:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
daveywinder/2020/07/29/hacker-gives-away-386-million-stolen-records-on-dark-web-what-youneed-to-do-now-shinyhunters-data-breach/?sh=4c2ae496f395.
26
Photon Research Team, Dark Web Monitoring: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, DIGITAL SHADOWS (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/dark-web-monitoring-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/.
27
Davey Winder, New Dark Web Audit Reveals 15 Billion Stolen Logins from 100,000
Breaches, FORBES (Jul. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2020/07/08/new-darkweb-audit-reveals-15-billion-stolen-logins-from-100000-breaches-passwords-hackers-cybercrime/
?sh=79c0cffc180f.
28
Charlie Osbourne, Over 23 Million Stolen Credit Cards are Being Traded on the Dark
Web, ZDNET (July 29, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/over-23-million-stolen-credit-cardsare-being-traded-on-the-dark-web/.
29
Average Price of Stolen Credentials on Dark Web Marketplaces as of February 2019,
STATISTA (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1007470/stolen-credentials-dark-web-
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One of the most common results of data breaches is identity theft.30
The 1998 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act defined identity
theft as “the knowing transfer, possession, or usage of any name or number that identifies another person, with the intent of committing or aiding
or abetting a crime.”31 In 2005, the U.S. Bureau of Statistics reported that
6.4 million households experienced one or more types of identity theft,
resulting in financial losses of over $11 billion.32 In 2016, the Bureau
reported that at least 17.7 million consumers were victims of identity
theft, resulting in financial losses of approximately $17.5 billion.33
A 2018 study by the White House’s Council of Economic Advisors
revealed that in 2016, malicious cyber activity34 cost the economy between $57 billion and $109 billion.35 Not only does data theft negatively
impact the economy, but stolen data affects both individuals and businesses alike.36 Theft of consumer and business information is a steadily
growing trend and a lucrative business for cybercriminals.37 As such, it is
imperative that victims of data theft be able to redress their harms in
court, which requires them to establish their right to stand before the
court, also known as standing.
II. STANDING
The Constitution vests the judicial powers of the United States in the
federal courts,38 with jurisdiction limited to “cases” and “controvermarket-price/; See also Miguel Gomez, Dark Web Price Index 2020, PRIVACY AFFAIRS (Oct. 3,
2020), https://www.privacyaffairs.com/dark-web-price-index-2020/.
30
Matt Tatham, Identity Theft Statistics, EXPERIEN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://
www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/identity-theft-statistics/.
31
William Roberds & Stacey L. Schreft, Data Security, Privacy, and Identity Theft: The
Economics Behind the Policy Debates, FED. RESV. BANK OF CHI. 22, 22 (2009), https://
www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/economic-perspectives/2009/ep-1qtr2009-part4-roberdsschreft-pdf.pdf.
32
Katrina Baum, U.S DEPARTMENT OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIFIC REPORT at 1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/it05.pdf.
33
Erika Harrel, U.S DEPARTMENT OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIFIC REPORT
at 1, 1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/it05.pdf.
34
THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE COST OF MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY TO THE
U.S. ECONOMY at 3, (2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=808776, (defining malicious
cyber activity as “an activity, other than one authorized by or in accordance with U.S. law, that seeks
to compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of computers, information or
communications systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or
information systems, or the information resident thereon”).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime.
38
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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sies.”39 An “essential and unchanging” part of the Article III case and
controversy requirement is standing.40 To establish standing, a plaintiff
must show the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing’s three
elements: (1) an “injury-in-fact,” (2) causation, and (3) a likelihood of
redressability.41 Establishing an injury-in-fact is currently the most contested element in data theft cases.42
An injury-in-fact “is an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”43 The injury-in-fact requirement of constitutional standing is generally a difficult element to prove in data breach
cases because it takes time for stolen data to eventually be used for nefarious purposes.44 Since the risk of future harm is not an actual injury, as
the harm has not yet occurred, it must satisfy the imminence requirement
of Article III standing. The imminence requirement has shown to be a
major roadblock to litigants alleging a future risk of harm, especially
where the alleged threat of future harm is identity theft.45
A. RECENT DECISIONS SHAPING THE “IMMINENCE” ELEMENT OF
INJURY-IN-FACT
A future injury satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement only where
the future injury is imminent. This section examines—through two
cases—two standards to evaluate the imminence of a future harm: certainly impending and substantial risk.46 In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Court held that the plaintiff alleged a future injury that was
39
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; The Two Classes of Cases and Controversies, LAW COR(Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/
the-two-classes-of-cases-and-controversies (Defining cases and controversies as “the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by
law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment
of wrongs.”).
40
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
41
Id. at 61.
42
Nancy R. Thomas, No Injury, No Data Breach Claims? Depends on the Circuit, MORRISON
FOERSTER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200917-no-data-breachclaims.html.
43
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-560 (1992).
44
Priscilla Fasoro & Lauren Wiseman, Standing Issues in Data Breach Litigation: An Overview, COVINGTON (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-security/data-breaches/standing-issues-in-data-breach-litigation-an-overview/.
45
Edward P. Boyle, Emilio W. Cividanes, & Stuart P. Ingis, The Impact of the Supreme
Court’s Recent Decision In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA on Privacy and Data-Security
Litigation, VENABLE (Mar. 2013), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2013/03/the-impact-of-the-supreme-courts-recent-decision-i.
46
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149 (2014).

NELL
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too speculative to satisfy the imminence element of the injury-in-fact requirement.47 Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”) of 1978 allows the U.S. government to conduct surveillance of
individuals “who are not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.”48 The plaintiffs’ work
required them to engage in sensitive communications with individuals
whom they expected to be likely targets of FISA surveillance.49 The
plaintiffs claimed an injury-in-fact that stemmed from the objectively
reasonable likelihood that their communications would be acquired “at
some point in the near future.”50
The Court did not find the plaintiffs’ injury-in-fact argument convincing, holding that their theory of future injury was too speculative to
be considered certainly impending.51 The Court characterized the plaintiff’s theory of standing as a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities”
that should not be considered certainly impending.52 However, the Court
acknowledged that plaintiffs do not have to be “literally certain that the
harms they identif[ied] will come about.”53 The Court explained how
they have found standing in some situations where there existed a substantial risk of future harm.54
The Court in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus held that a plaintiff
had established the injury-in-fact element by showing a substantial risk
of future harm.55 Plaintiff Susan B. Anthony List (“SBA”) was a pro-life
organization that criticized members of Congress for their votes supporting a tax-payer funded abortion bill during a political campaign.56 SBA
attempted to erect a billboard condemning a congressman for his vote, a
billboard that was never displayed after the congressman threatened the
company that owned the billboard space with legal action.57 The congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging that SBA had violated a statute that prohibited false statements made
during any campaign for nomination or election to public office or office
of a political party.58 The Congressman’s suit was dismissed, but SBA
47

Id. at 401.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
52
Id. at 410.
53
Id. at 414.
54
Id.
55
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014).
56
Id. at 153-54.
57
Id. at 154.
58
Id.
48
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challenged the constitutionality of the statute on First Amendment
grounds.59
SBA argued that the statute “chilled” their speech, that SBA planned
“to engage in substantially similar activity in the future,” and that they
therefore faced the prospect of future injury—the “prospect of its speech
and associational rights again being chilled and burdened.”60 The Court
upheld the plaintiff’s standing because “the threat of future enforcement
of the false statement statute is substantial.”61 Importantly, the Court
elected to use the substantial risk standard rather than the certainly impending standard used in Clapper, signifying that both of the standards
of future injury are valid to establish an injury-in-fact.62
B. CLARIFICATION OF THE “CONCRETENESS” ELEMENT OF INJURY-INFACT
In Spokeo v. Robbins, the Court further clarified earlier dicta that an
injury-in-fact must be both “concrete and particularized.”63 This decision
resulted in a stricter standard for the injury-in-fact element.64 Previously,
courts analyzed concreteness and particularization together, as the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did in Spokeo prior to its appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Spokeo is a company that operates a search engine that allows users
to input information and search a wide variety of databases that provides
users with information on individuals.65 Spokeo was used to perform a
search on plaintiff Robbins, which resulted in the garnering and dissemination of inaccurate information.66 Robbins filed suit alleging that
Spokeo willfully failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970, which requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports
. . . and imposes liability on ‘[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply
with any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any’ individual.”67
The Supreme Court reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint and clarified
the “concrete” and “particularized” standard for establishing the injury59

Id. at 155.
Id.
61
Id. at 164.
62
Id. 158-164.
63
Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
64
Spokeo’s Implications for Cyber-Security Litigation, HUGHES HUBBARD (last visitied, Nov.
4, 2021), https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/ealert-spokeos-implications-for-cyber-securitylitigation.
65
Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
66
Id.
67
Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542-43 (2016).
60
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in-fact element. An injury is considered particularized if it “affect[s] the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”68 “A ‘concrete’ injury must
be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”69 However, the Court did not
synonymize “concrete” with “tangible,” affirming that intangible injuries
can be concrete.70 Most importantly, the Court stated that a real risk of
harm can satisfy concreteness,71 meaning that the imminence standard
for future harm expounded upon in Clapper and Susan B. Anthony is
connected with and may be sufficient for a finding of concreteness.
III. INJURY-IN-FACT IN DATA BREACH CASES
Prior to the Supreme Court’s attempts in Clapper and Spokeo to
clarify standing in data breach cases, federal circuit courts were split on
whether a risk of future harm could satisfy the injury-in-fact element of
standing, and the degree of future harm that would achieve that result. To
interpret the injury-in-fact requirement, circuit courts developed two distinct approaches—the permissive, plaintiff-friendly approach, and the
prohibitive, defendant-friendly approach.
A. THE PERMISSIVE APPROACH
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits developed
a permissive and inclusive standard when identifying which injuries
would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.72 For example, the courts in
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. held
that an increased risk of future harm is sufficient to satisfy the injury-infact requirement.
The court in Pisciotta held that the injury-in-fact requirement could
be satisfied by an increased risk of future harm.73 Old National Bancorp
(“ONB”) operated a website where prospective customers could apply
for accounts, loans, and other ONB services online.74 Online applications
required users to input customer names, addresses, social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and credit card or other
financial account information.75 After a breach of ONB’s website, plain68

Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n. 1 (1992)).
Id. at 1548.
70
Id. at 1549.
71
Id.
72
Kristen L. Bryan, Denied! Federal Court Allows Claims to Proceed Concerning Wide
Scale Data Breach, NAT’L LAW REV. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/denied-federal-court-allows-claims-to-proceed-concerning-wide-scale-data-breach.
73
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
74
Id. at 631.
75
Id.
69
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tiffs filed a putative class action alleging that ONB failed to adequately
protect the consumers’ personal information and that the plaintiffs would
suffer a future threat of injury.76 Despite a failure to allege any “direct
financial losses”77 as a result of the data breach, the court held that the
injury-in-fact element could be satisfied in two ways: by showing a
threat of future harm, or by showing an act which increases the risk of
future harm.78
The court in Krottner also held that alleging an increased risk of
future injury may satisfy the injury-in-fact element.79 In Krottner,
thieves stole a laptop containing unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers of approximately 97 thousand Starbucks employees.80 Although the plaintiffs did not allege that the stolen data had been
misused, the court still found that the injury-in-fact element was met
based on a “credible threat of real and immediate harm” stemming from
the stolen unencrypted personal data.81 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff’s allegation that an increased risk
of future identity theft was sufficient for a finding of injury-in-fact and
that the plaintiff satisfied standing.
B. THE PROHIBITIVE APPROACH
In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a more restrictive view of the injury-in-fact requirement. The
key distinction between Reilly and the more lenient holdings in Pisciotta
and Krottner is that the Third Circuit in Reilly required evidence of misuse or malicious intent of breached data to establish an injury-in-fact.82
In Reilly, the court held that the Appellants’ allegations of future
injury were too speculative to establish standing.83 Ceridian is a payroll
processing company that collects its customers’ and employees’ information for operational purposes.84 This information includes employees’
names, addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information.85 A hacker gained access to Ceridian’s system and
potentially accessed the personal and financial information of approxi76

Id. 632.
Id.
78
Id. 634.
79
Id. 1143.
80
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
81
Id. at 1143.
82
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).
83
Id. at 46.
84
Id. at 40.
85
Id.
77
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mately 27 thousand employees at 1,900 companies.86 However, Ceridian
could not determine whether the hacker “read, copied, or understood the
data.”87
The court held that the Appellants’ allegations of a “hypothetical,
future injury [did] not establish standing under Article III.”88 The court
reasoned that the Appellants’ contentions relied on a speculative chain of
events that was too attenuated to establish an injury-in-fact; a chain of
events requiring that the hacker “(1) read, copied, and understood their
personal information; (2) intend[d] to commit future criminal acts by
misusing the information;” and (3) possess the ability to use such information to the detriment of the Appellants.89 Thus, the court deemed the
risk of future injury too speculative to rise to the level of a certainly
impending threat.90
The court distinguished Reilly from Pisciotta and Krottner in that
the threatened harms in the latter two cases were significantly more imminent and certainly impending than they were in Reilly.91 In Pisciotta,
the court emphasized the existence of evidence showing that the hacker’s
intrusion was sophisticated and malicious.92 In Krottner, the court highlighted the fact that someone attempted to open a bank account with the
plaintiff’s information following the theft.93 By contrast, the court in
Reilly found that the absence of evidence showing malicious intent or
misuse meant that the “string of hypothetical injuries” were insufficient
to establish that the plaintiffs had suffered either an actual or imminent
injury.94
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER A RISK OF FUTURE
HARM SATISFIES THE INJURY-IN-FACT REQUIREMENT
Despite Clapper, the federal circuit court split regarding whether a
risk of future harm satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement remains. The
following cases reflect the differing opinions on this issue, which have
yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court. The circuit split reflects two
opposing approaches: a defendant-friendly approach, and a plaintifffriendly approach.
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. 41.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 43.
91
Id. at 44.
92
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
93
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).
94
Id.
87
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A. THE DEFENDANT-FRIENDLY APPROACH
The First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit courts have all championed a defendant-friendly approach to the injury-in-fact analysis concerning whether a future risk of harm from stolen personal information is
substantial or a certainly impending.
1. The Fourth Circuit: Beck v. McDonald
In Beck v. McDonald, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
used a restrictive interpretation of the injury-in-fact requirement. Although the facts in Beck resemble those in Krottner—the stolen laptop
case—the Fourth Circuit arrived at a different result from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Krottner.
Plaintiffs in Beck received medical treatment and health care at a
hospital that experienced two data breaches.95 A laptop containing unencrypted information of approximately 7,400 patients was misplaced or
stolen from a hospital.96 The unencrypted data on this laptop included
“names, birth dates, the last four digits of social security numbers, and
physical descriptors (age, race, gender, height, and weight).”97 An internal investigation showed that the hospital failed to follow the policies
and procedures for handling a non-encrypted laptop that stored patient
information.98
As in Krottner, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was a future threat of
identity theft.99 First, the court applied the certainly impending standard
for imminence.100 The Fourth Circuit held that for the plaintiffs to have
suffered an injury, the court must “engage with the same attenuated chain
of possibilities” that was rejected in Clapper.101 Notably, the court considered persuasive the plaintiffs’ failure to establish the thieves’ intent to
steal information.102 In other words, the court valued and analyzed the
thieves’ intent—whether the thieves’ intended simply to steal a laptop, or
to steal the data in the laptop.103
Next, the court applied the substantial risk standard for imminence
and arrived at the same result.104 Here, the court analyzed the plaintiffs’
95

Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 267.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 267-268.
100
Id. at 268.
101
Id. at 275
102
Id. at 274-275.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 275.
96
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contention that 33% of those affected by the data breach would become
victims of identity theft.105 Surprisingly, the court established a bright
line rule, saying that data breaches resulting in the identity theft of 33%
of those affected “falls far short” of establishing a substantial risk of
harm.106
Thus, Beck is notable for four reasons. First, the Beck court considered noteworthy the intent of the thieves.107 Second, the court considered
Clapper as controlling over Beck, which shares the same type of facts
with Krottner and Pisciotta.108 Third, the court not only applied the substantial risk standard, but held that data breaches resulting in the identity
theft of 33% of those affected “falls far short” of meeting the standard.109
Fourth, the court considered the elapsed time from a data breach as indicative of whether an injury is merely speculative.110
2. The Eighth Circuit: In re SuperValu, Inc.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in In re SuperValu Inc.
held that the risk of harm from identity theft did not establish a substantial risk sufficient to establish standing.111 Defendant SuperValu Inc., an
operator of retail grocery stores, suffered multiple data breaches resulting
in the theft of customer information.112 Over a period of almost a month,
cybercriminals accessed the defendant’s computer network that
processes payment card transactions for 1,045 of the defendant’s
stores.113 The hackers installed malware into the defendant’s network
that gave them access to customer names, credit or debit card account
numbers, expiration dates, card verification value codes, and PIN
numbers.114
The plaintiffs, a group of consumers who shopped at defendant’s
stores, claimed that the defendants failed to adequately protect consumer
card information.115 As a result, hackers gained access to their credit card
information.116 The plaintiffs’ alleged injury-in-fact was a risk of future
105

Id. at 275-276.
Id. 276.
107
Id.at 274.
108
Id. at 275.
109
Id. at 276.
110
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (Holding that “as the breaches fade
further into the past, the Plaintiffs’ threatened injuries become more and more speculative.”).
111
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771 (8th Cir. 2017).
112
Id. at 765.
113
Id. at 766.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
106
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identity theft as a result of the data breach.117 After acknowledging that
either the substantial risk or the certainly impending standard could be
used to find standing, the Eighth Circuit ultimately elected to analyze this
case under the substantial risk standard.118 The court held that the risk of
concrete harm from identity theft was not substantial.119
In arriving at its holding, the court relied on the 2007 United States
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report on data breaches.120
Guided by the GAO report, the court determined that stolen credit card
information, without other information such as social security numbers,
is generally insufficient to open unauthorized new accounts.121 As a result, the court concluded that there was little to no risk that the stolen
credit card information would be used for “the type of identity theft
generally considered to have a more harmful direct effect on consumers.”
Next, in an attempt to establish a substantial risk of harm, the court
asked whether stolen credit card numbers could result in credit or debit
card fraud.122 The GAO report did not “plausibly support the contention
that consumers affected by a data breach face a substantial risk of credit
or debit card fraud.”123 The court cited passages from the GAO report
declaring that the best available evidence indicated that most data
breaches do not result in detected identity theft.124 For example,
“[b]ecause the report finds that data breaches are unlikely to result in
account fraud, it does not support the allegation that defendants’ data
breaches create a substantial risk that plaintiffs will suffer credit or debit
card fraud.”125
Thus, SuperValu illustrates the fundamental difference in reasoning
evident in the circuit split. As with the holding in Beck, the defendantfriendly circuit courts do not find a substantial risk of injury when evaluating stolen credit card information. Conversely, the plaintiff-friendly
circuit courts regard stolen credit card information as evidence of a substantial risk of injury.126

117

Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
119
Id. at 771.
120
Id. at 767.
121
Id. at 770.
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Id.
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Id. at 771.
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Id.
125
Id.
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See infra Part V, Section B.
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B. THE PLAINTIFF-FRIENDLY APPROACH
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Third,
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all championed a plaintifffriendly approach to the injury-in-fact analysis when determining
whether a future risk of harm due to stolen personal information is a
substantial risk or a certainly impending risk.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group
In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, the court held that the risk of
future harm was substantial, and therefore was both consistent with
Clapper and sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact.127 Here, hackers
stole credit card information of the approximately 350,000 customers of
the luxury department store Neiman Marcus.128 The plaintiffs filed a
complaint alleging a number of theories for relief, including negligence
and violations of data breach laws.129 Among other actual injuries, the
plaintiffs alleged standing based on “two imminent injuries: an increased
risk of future fraudulent charges and greater susceptibility to identity
theft.”130 The court agreed with the plaintiffs.131
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Remijas from Clapper in that
Clapper addressed speculative thefts that may never occur.132 By contrast, in Remijas, the personal information had already been stolen.133
Furthermore, approximately 9,200 of the 350,000 stolen credit card numbers had already experienced fraudulent charges.134
The court inferred a substantial risk of harm in part from the apparent intent of the data breach.135 The court presumed that the purpose of
the data breach was to make fraudulent charges or to assume the customers’ identities, because “[w]hy else would hackers break into a store’s
database and steal consumers’ private information?”136
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit opined that plaintiffs eventually may not
be able to “provide an adequate factual basis” for their claims that remain
at risk of harm for any extended period of time. The court noted how127

Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 689-90.
129
Id. at 693.
130
Id. at 692.
131
Id. at 697.
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Id. at 692-93.
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Id. at 692.
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Id. at 690.
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Id. at 693.
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ever, that this eventuality was not the proper burden at the current stage
in the pleadings.137
2. The Ninth Circuit: In re Zappos.com, Inc.
In In re Zappos.com, Inc., the court held that where data thieves
steal the type of information that will allow them to commit identity
theft, the plaintiffs may establish standing by alleging threat of future
harm.138 Hackers breached online retailer Zappos.com, Inc.’s (“Zappos”)
servers, stealing “the names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit
and debit card information of more than 24 million Zappos customers.”139 Several customers filed a class action suit against Zappos asserting that Zappos had not properly protected their personal information.140
The plaintiffs alleged that the data breach put them at an increased risk of
harm from identity theft.141
First, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether Krottner was still good law
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper.142 The court determined that Krottner is reconcilable with Clapper.143 The court distinguished Krottner from Clapper in two ways. First, as opposed to
Clapper, the alleged injury in Krottner did not require a speculative and
attenuated chain of inferences.144 And second, that the standing analysis
in Clapper was especially rigorous because the case arose in a “sensitive
national security context.”145
Next, the court established that Krottner controlled Zappos.146 In
Krottner, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the sensitivity of the stolen information combined with its theft indicated an “adequately alleged injuryin-fact supporting standing.”147 Here, the stolen information was the
same, but in addition full credit card numbers were stolen.148 However,
unlike the victims in Krottner, the victims in Zappos did not have their
social security numbers stolen.149 The court referred to congressional
137

Id. at 694.
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2018).
139
Id. at 1023
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. 1026-1027.
144
Id. at 1026.
145
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (9th Cir. 2013)).
146
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018).
147
Id. at 1027 (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)).
148
Id. at 1023, 1027.
149
Id. at 1027.
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legislation preventing the printing of credit card numbers on receipts in
an attempt to curb identity theft to support its finding that the stolen
credit card information gave the “hackers the means to commit fraud or
identity theft.”150
Thus, in Zappos, the Ninth Circuit established that stolen personal
identifying information and credit card information, without stolen social
security numbers, was sufficiently sensitive to give hackers the ability to
commit fraud or identity theft, therefore establishing a substantial risk of
harm.151 Furthermore, the court indicated that, based on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Clapper, the certainly impending standard should be
used in situations of national security, while the lower, substantial risk
standard, should be used in all other cases.152
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to recognize the severity and
immediacy of problems associated with data theft by allowing aggrieved
parties to rightfully and litigate against companies that employ inadequate protections for consumers’ sensitive personal information. The federal circuit courts use varying standards to evaluate whether data theft is
sufficient to establish the injury-in-fact element of standing. The plaintiff-friendly Remijas court considered the intent of the hackers;153 the
plaintiff-friendly Zappos court looked at the sensitivity of the information;154 the defendant-friendly Beck court considered the amount of time
since a breach to determine whether a harm was speculative;155 and finally, since Clapper, courts’ opinions vary across the board regarding
whether to use the certainly impending or the substantial risk standards,
with some arguing that the certainly impending standard should only be
used for instances implicating national security.156
The Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by allowing consumers the ability to redress injuries resulting from the negligent or reckless conduct of companies. Accordingly, to resolve this federal circuit
court split, the Supreme Court should use the next data breach case to
establish the substantial risk standard as controlling in data breach litigation and require only a showing of a data breach resulting in the theft of
sensitive information to establish constitutional standing. By resolving
150

Id.
Id. at 1029.
152
Id. at 1026.
153
See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
154
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017).
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In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the circuit split, the Supreme Court can avoid problems associated with
forum shopping, unintended injustices that prevent consumers from litigating their claims, confusion over which standard should be used to
determine standing, and the specific requirements for establishing the injury-in-fact requirement of standing.
A. AN UNRESOLVED SPLIT AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
ENCOURAGES FORUM SHOPPING
The Supreme Court needs to resolve this circuit split to prevent forum shopping.157 Currently, choice of forum may determine the result of
cases alleging future harm due to data theft.158 Companies are likely to
take legal measures to ensure that they can litigate claims in defendantfriendly forums with defendant-friendly law, so as to make future litigation more predictable.159 For instance, in their terms of service, they can
insist on forum selection clauses,160 choice of law clauses, or binding
arbitration that would severely impact consumers ability to effectively
fight for damages.161 Defendants can also gain unfair advantages by forcing plaintiffs to litigate far from home in a forum that uses laws
favorable to defendants.162 Thus, a forum selection clause immediately
leads to increased leverage in lawsuit negotiations.163

157
“Forum Shopping” refers to a plaintiff choosing the court that will redress their injury
most favorably, when multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Forum Shopping, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forum_shopping (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
158
Nancy R. Thomas, No Injury, No Data Breach Claims? Depends on the Circuit, MORRISON FOERSTER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200917-no-data-breachclaims.html.
159
Keeping Current: U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms that Forum-Selection Clauses Are Presumptively Enforceable, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/01/keeping_current_duffee/.
160
A forum selection clause specifies where the parties must litigate disputes arising under
the contract. David C. McCormack. Negotiating a Business Contract? Don’t Ignore Forum Selection
Clauses, AXLEY ATTORNEYS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.axley.com/publication_article/forum-selection-clauses/.
161
Jimmie E. Gates, Arbitration Agreements: Hurting Consumers or Saving Money?, CLARLEDGER (May 5, 2017), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2017/05/05/arbitration-agree
ments-hurting-consumers-saving-money/101284330/.

ION

162
See Generally James A. Meaney & Esra R. Jackson, Forum Selection Clauses After Atlantic Marine, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 15-17, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/events/franchising/materials2014/w4.pdf.
163
David C. McCormack. Negotiating a Business Contract? Don’t Ignore Forum Selection
Clauses, AXLEY ATTORNEYS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.axley.com/publication_article/forum-selection-clauses/.
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B. RELAXING THE STANDING REQUIREMENT ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO
LITIGATE THEIR CLAIMS
Today, online purchases or applications commonly require the electronic dissemination of sensitive information, such as addresses, credit
card numbers, and social security numbers.164 As a result, consumers
need to be able to hold negligent and reckless companies accountable for
failing to adequately protect their sensitive information. Ten percent of
Americans,165 33% of American adults, and 25% of adults at least 55
years old have experienced identity theft.166 However, this is not only an
adult problem.167 One million children were victims of identity theft in
2017.168 Identity theft is the most likely consequence of data breach, accounting for 65% of data breach incidents, which indicates a substantial
risk of identity theft following data thefts.169 Thus, the seriousness of
data theft in America requires plaintiff-friendly enforcement standards
that will hold companies accountable for maintaining strict safeguards.
To reiterate the Remijas court, granting a plaintiff standing to sue
does not guarantee a favorable outcome on the merits.170 Standing is
merely a threshold matter.171 However, if standing is not granted, victims
of reckless and negligent data management by large companies and corporations would experience draconian effects.172 The absence of a unified plaintiff-friendly standard preempts many Americans from any
164

See generally Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States
from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/databreaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed.
165
Sam Cook, Identity Theft Facts & Statistics: 2019-2020, COMPARITECH, https://
www.comparitech.com/identity-theft-protection/identity-theft-statistics/ (last updated Aug. 23,
2021).
166
Global Cybersecurity Awareness Survey Reveals 33 Percent of U.S. Respondents Have
Experienced Identity Theft, More Than Twice the Global Average, PROOFPOINT (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/newsroom/press-releases/global-cybersecurity-awareness-surveyreveals-33-percent-us-respondents-have; Eugene Bekker, What Are Your odds of Getting Your Identity Stolen?, IDENTITY FORCE (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/identity-theftodds-identity-theft-statistics.
167
Kelli B. Grant, Identity Theft Isn’t Just an Adult Problem. Kids are Victims Too, CNBC
(Apr. 24, 2018, 9:23 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/child-identity-theft-is-a-growing-andexpensive-problem.html.
168
Chris Morris, More Than 1 Million Children Were Victims of Identity Theft in 2017, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/04/24/stolen-identity-theft-childrenkids/.
169
Jennifer Bellemare, What Are Your odds of Getting Your Identity Stolen?, IDENTITY FORCE
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/identity-theft-odds-identity-theft-statistics.
170
See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).
171
Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A, 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810.
172
John A. Fisher, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the Negligent
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 236 (2013), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol4/iss1/7.
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redressability until they have already suffered the consequences of an
injury, due to the difficulty of proving a future harm is certainly
impending.173
The doctrine of standing has constitutional origins—a constitution
that predates the invention of the internet. The Supreme Court should
interpret the constitutional requirement of standing in a modern-day context so that American consumers can receive the justice and protection
they deserve. Afterall, Americans experience identity theft at a rate twice
the global average.174
C. ESTABLISHING THE SUBSTANTIAL RISK STANDARD AS
CONTROLLING IN DATA THEFT CASES CAN RESOLVE THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
Currently, lower courts have indicated that the substantial risk standard should be used in cases implicating national security.175 Since Clapper, the federal circuit courts have shown a willingness to apply the less
stringent, substantial risk standard to cases not involving questions of
national security.176 The substantial risk standard should be used in cases
outside the national security context because the nature of future harms
from data theft makes it significantly more difficult to prove that a harm
is certainly impending.177 Many data breaches result in the theft of a vast
amount of personal information, making it difficult for plaintiffs to establish a certainty of future harm.178 However, statistical research shows
that actual injuries regularly follow from data thefts.179 Policy should
reflect support for injured parties who are susceptible to commonplace
and life-altering harms that come from identity theft, rather than the defense of businesses and corporations that fail to adequately protect their
customers’ sensitive information.
173

See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401, 410 (2013).
Global Cybersecurity Awareness Survey Reveals 33 Percent of U.S. Respondents Have
Experienced Identity Theft, More Than Twice the Global Average, PROOF POINT (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/newsroom/press-releases/global-cybersecurity-awareness-surveyreveals-33-percent-us-respondents-have.
175
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018).
176
See Id. at 1024-25.
177
See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Without more
than allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that
the law is prepared to remedy.”).
178
See Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the
United States from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (March 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
273550/data-breaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/.
179
THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE COST OF MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY TO THE
U.S. ECONOMY (Feb. 2018). https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=808776.
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D. THE OCCURRENCE OF A DATA THEFT OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION
SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE INJURY-IN-FACT
REQUIREMENT
The courts have considered different kinds of information when determining whether a substantial risk of harm exists, including timing, intent, and sensitivity.180 The risk of identity theft is fairly obvious
today.181 The impact of data thefts are no longer a mystery—over fifteen
years of data supports the notion that data theft regularly occurs and its
likelihood to result in injury.182 For this reason, the only considerations
into whether an injury-in-fact is established due to a future threat of harm
should be (1) whether a data theft occurred, and (2) the sensitivity of the
information.
An inquiry into the intent of a data theft should not be required because the occurrence of a data theft inherently indicates the intent to steal
data and misappropriate its use.183 Similarly, the amount of time elapsed
since the occurrence of a data theft should not be relevant in determining
an injury-in-fact. Once information is stolen, it can be passed around and
sold for any extended period of time, resulting in a threat of identity risk
that may never subside.184 An approach that only looks at the sensitivity
of the information and whether a data breach occurred would simplify
the analyses for courts and relieve them from inquiring into redundant
considerations. It would also provide the United States with a more simple, straightforward, and standardized way of dealing with questions of
standing in threat of future harm, data theft cases.
Lastly, the sensitivity of the information should be the paramount
inquiry into whether an injury-in-fact exists—only sensitive stolen data
should confer standing on a plaintiff. Sensitive data includes personally
identifiable information185, personal health information186, and financial
180

See supra Analysis.
See Generally Global Cybersecurity Awareness Survey Reveals 33 Percent of U.S. Respondents Have Experienced Identity Theft, More Than Twice the Global Average, PROOF POINT
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.proofpoint.com/us/newsroom/press-releases/global-cybersecurityawareness-survey-reveals-33-percent-us-respondents-have.
182
See J. Charlton Collins, Check on Data Breaches at the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2019/
sep/data-breaches-privacy-rights-clearinghouse.html.
183
See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
184
Adam Shell, Equifax data breach could create lifelong identity theft threat, USA TODAY
(Sept. 9, 2021, 10:08 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/09/equifax-databreach-could-create-life-long-identity-theft-threat/646765001/.
185
Personally identifiable information is “data that could be used to identify, contact, or locate a specific individual or distinguish one person from another: this information includes social
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information.187 Plaintiffs should not be able to establish standing by alleging the disclosure or theft or other information that is publicly available, such as a telephone number or zip code. The injury must be
supported by sensitive information that could result in more severe harms
such as fraud or identity theft.
CONCLUSION
Data theft and data analytics are billion-dollar industries—and
growing.188 By stealing personal data, thieves cannot only commit identity fraud, but they can obtain much of the same information that businesses covet when marketing to consumers.189 Customer data is an
increasingly valuable commodity in itself,190 and consumers need appropriate protection.
The Supreme Court can provide appropriate guidance by establishing a consistent standard that also provides consumers with a means of
seeking redress for harms resulting from data theft. Companies that manage large quantities of consumer data have a duty to safeguard the information. By taking a more relaxed stance on establishing an injury-in-fact
in cases alleging a future risk of injury, courts enable the public to fight
back against negligent and reckless acts by people and businesses with
whom they have entrusted their data. Currently, many companies are not
held accountable for harmful business tactics,191 in part because the Supreme Court has not given adequate guidance on the issue.
The Supreme Court should take advantage of the next data breach
case to establish the more lenient substantial risk standard as the controlling standard in data breach cases. The Court should also require only an
allegation of an actual data breach and theft of sensitive information to
establish the injury-in-fact requirement. A consistent standard would al186
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low consumers greater access to redressability and would also force businesses to act more responsibly with sensitive consumer data.
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